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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 960227-CA
Priority No. 2

RANDY J. MONTOYA,
Defendant/Appellant.

INTRODUCTION
Arguments not addressed in this reply brief were
adequately analyzed in Appellant's opening brief or do not merit
reply.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN CONCLUDING THAT A VALID INVENTORY SEARCH
OCCURRED.
A. THE STATE DID NOT ESTABLISH A LAWFUL
IMPOUNDMENT.
A lawful impoundment is required for a valid inventory
search.

See State v. Hvah, 711 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1985).

In

this case, a lawful impoundment did not occur where the officers
did not establish the nature of the standards guiding inventory
searches, used the search as a pretext to search for drugs, and
returned the vehicle to its owner after searching it.

See

Appellant's opening brief at 15-39.
The State argues that it need not establish "reasonable
and proper justification for impoundment" due to the post-Hygh
decision in Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987).
State's brief at 9-10.

See

In Bertine, the Court relied on its prior

decision in Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983), pointing

out that "[t]he reasonableness of any particular governmental
activity does not necessarily or invariably turn on the existence
of alternative 'less intrusive' means."

Bertine, 479 U.S. at

374, quoting Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 647.

Bertine does not rule

out a consideration of the necessity of the impoundment.

Id.

Instead, pursuant to Bertine, the focus is on whether the State
established the existence of reasonable, standardized procedures
relating to the impoundment and inventorying of vehicles and that
such procedures were administered in good faith.
U.S. at 374.

Bertine, 479

Additionally, post-Bertine cases require that a

vehicle be "properly impounded . . .
reasonable, standardized procedures."

in good faith following
State v. Shamblin, 763

P.2d 425, 426 (Utah App. 1988) (citation omitted).
Montoya is arguing in this unusual case where the
officers conducted an extensive "inventory" search of the vehicle
but did not impound it, the State failed to establish that a
lawful impoundment occurred or the necessity of inventorying the
vehicle.

Because a lawful impoundment did not occur in this

case, the "inventory" search was not justified.
In regard to the policy for returning a vehicle to a nonarrestee owner, Officer McCarthy stated, "That's the decision I
made as the senior man on the scene because I know the family."
R. 111.

This response coupled with his previous responses fails

to establish the nature of the policy for impounding vehicles
where the owner is not arrested.

Instead, the testimony suggests

that rather than following a standardized procedure in impounding
2

vehicles, the senior officer has unbridled discretion.

Such

unbridled discretion does not pass constitutional muster since it
allows officers to decide whether to conduct inventory searches
without being directed by standardized procedures.

See Florida

v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990).
In addition, the State's claim on page 13 of its brief
that "officers initiated their impoundment procedure while
simultaneously trying to locate the Mitsubishi's owner" is not
supported by the evidence.

Indeed, the State fails to support

this statement with record cites.

The evidence actually suggests

that officers began "inventorying" the vehicle before attempting
to locate the owner.

R. 98, 100, 106, 107, 115-16, 125.x

Montoya argued in the trial court, among other things,
that the failure to impound the vehicle rendered the "inventory"
search invalid and that the inventory search was a pretext to
search for drugs.

R. 28-31.

He relied on a number of cases

including Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, and State v. Strickling, 844 P.2d
979, 987 (Utah App. 1992).

Under these circumstances, Montoya's

arguments on appeal regarding the inventory search were preserved
for review.

1

Montoya quotes a portion of McCarthy's testimony on page 29
of his brief, inadvertently deleting a portion of the testimony
which refers to the use of a canine and the prosecutor's follow-up
question. The State includes the complete quote in footnote 2 on
page 11 of its brief.
The deleted portion indicates that the
officer called for a canine officer, but that there was not one
available, and that McCarthy does not ordinarily make an inventory
list in the course of an inventory search.
R. 110-11; see
transcript in Addendum A to this brief.
3

B. THE STATE DID NOT ESTABLISH THAT THE
"INVENTORY" SEARCH WAS DONE IN CONFORMANCE WITH
STANDARDIZED PROCEDURES.
The State is correct that the officers testified that
West Valley City has a standardized procedure for inventorying
vehicles.

See State's brief at 13.

The officers did not,

however, sufficiently outline the details of that standardized
procedure so that the trial judge or this Court could make a
determination as to whether the policy was followed in this case.
Testimony that the policy was followed is not sufficient;
instead, the State must establish the details of the policy so
that the fact finder can determine whether the policy was
followed in a given case.

See Stricklinq, 844 P.2d at 988-90

(noting that although evidence of departmental procedures was
thin, it was sufficient to establish that such procedures existed
and that officers acted in conformity with the procedures).
Additionally, the officers supplied conflicting testimony as to
whether they were required pursuant to the standardized
procedures to fill out an inventory form as part of an inventory
search.

See R. 104 (inventory form is required); 105-06

(inventory form is not necessarily standard procedure); 111
(officer does not ordinarily make an inventory list but there is
an inventory sheet which he frequently uses).
Although the State has the burden of establishing that a
valid inventory search was conducted, it attempts to shift that
burden to Montoya by arguing that since Montoya never asked
whether the inventory search policy included a search of the
4

trunk, Montoya waived the argument.

State's brief at 15.

This

claim by the State reflects a fundamental misunderstanding as to
the State's burden in attempting to establish that police
activity fits within an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement.

See Strickling, 844 P. 2d at 985.

As this Court

pointed out:
Numerous decisions require that the
government demonstrate the existence of
standardized procedures to regulate particular
aspects of police conduct during inventory
searches in order for such searches to satisfy
the Fourth Amendment. See e.g. Florida v. Wells,
495 U.S. 1, 4, 110 S.Ct. 1632, 1635, 109 L.Ed.2d
1 (1990) (where no policy existed regarding
treatment of closed containers during inventory
search police could not open locked suitcase);
State v. Johnson, 745 P.2d 452, 455 (Utah 1987)
(police were justified in looking under hood when
such a search was conducted according to police
department procedures for all vehicles);
Shamblin, 763 P.2d at 427-28 ("Fourth Amendment
is violated if closed containers are opened
during a vehicle inventory search in the absence
of a standardized, specific procedure mandating
their opening") (emphasis in original).
Strickling, 844 P.2d at 988.
The State failed to establish in this case that the
standardized procedures for inventory searches by West Valley
Police included the trunk and/or under the spare tire.
Regardless of whether a trunk is an obvious area of concern when
conducting an inventory search, the State had the burden of
establishing that the standardized procedure encompassed a search
of the trunk.

The State's failure to establish that the search

of the trunk and under the spare tire was done in conformance
with standardized procedure is not attributable to Montoya;
5

instead, it demonstrates that the State failed to sustain its
burden in this case of establishing that the search was made in
conformance with standardized procedures.

The search therefore

fails to qualify under the inventory search exception.
C. LACK OF PRETEXT IS A PREREQUISITE FOR A VALID
INVENTORY SEARCH.
The totality of the circumstances in this case
demonstrate that the "inventory" search of the vehicle was a
pretext or subterfuge to search for narcotics evidence.
Appellant's opening brief at 33-38.

See

Relying on State v. Lopez,

873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994); State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196 (Utah
1995); and Whren v. United States,

U.S.

, 116 S.Ct. 1769,

135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996), the State claims pretext analysis should
be rejected in the inventory search context.

State's brief at

15-17.
The analyses in Lopez, Harmon and Whren are
distinguishable from an inventory search analysis since those
cases considered police investigations of criminal conduct where
officers had probable cause or a reasonable suspicion to justify
their activity.

By contrast, a valid inventory search occurs in

the absence of probable cause and suspends the probable cause/
warrant requirement.
In an inventory context, the State need not establish
probable cause or reasonable suspicion in order to justify the
exception.

Instead, it must establish that a valid inventory

search occurred, thereby suspending the particularized suspicion
requirement.

Inventorying a vehicle must not be a ruse or
6

subterfuge in order to allow the suspension of the probable cause
requirement.

See Whren, 135 L.Ed.2d at 97. By contrast, in

Whren, Lopez and Harmon, the officers had probable cause or
reasonable suspicion to justify the detention when the
circumstances were viewed objectively.

Pretext analysis was

therefore unnecessary since the Fourth Amendment probable
cause/reasonable suspicion requirement was met.
In order to be a valid inventory search which allows
suspension of the probable cause/warrant requirement, the
inventory search must not be a pretext.

The lack of subterfuge

or pretext is a prerequisite for allowing an inventory search to
be upheld even though officers had neither a warrant nor
particularized suspicion.

See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S.

364, 370 (1976); Wells, 495 U.S. at 3; Hygh, 711 P.2d at 268;
Whren, 135 L.Ed.2d at 97.
POINT II. THE STATE'S ALTERNATIVE SEARCH
ARGUMENTS, RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL,
DO NOT PROVIDE A BASIS FOR AFFIRMANCE.
The State makes a two-step fall back argument for the
first time on appeal.

See State's brief at 17-23.

The State

claims that (1) the search of the passenger compartment was done
incident to arrest, and (2) the officers had probable cause and
exigent circumstances which justified the search of the entire
vehicle.

This two-step argument does not support affirmance in

this case since the State did not raise the arguments in the
trial court, it did not introduce evidence sustaining its burden
of establishing the arguments and the trial judge did not make
7

factual findings regarding disputed facts relating to the newly
raised arguments.
While this Court may affirm a trial court's ruling on an
alternative ground which was not relied on by the trial court,
such affirmance on an alternative ground is not appropriate where
the State did not introduce evidence to sustain its burden of
establishing that ground or factual issues relating to that
ground have not been resolved by the trial court.

See State v.

Wells, 3 04 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 8-9 (Utah App. 1996) (refusing to
affirm on alternative ground of search incident to arrest where
State "failed to meet its burden of proof to justify [the] search
as a search incident to arrest"); Limb v. Federated Milk
Producers Assn., 461 P.2d 290, 293 n.2 (Utah 1969) (record must
support alternative basis in order to affirm on that ground);
State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 454 (Utah 1996) (refusing to
consider State's alternative basis for affirmance which was
raised for first time on certiorari due to "lack of factual
findings combined with failure to raise [the] issue below");
State v. Franks, 889 P.2d 209, 212 (N.M. 1994) ("unfair to an
appellant to affirm on a fact dependent ground not raised
below").

Additionally, this Court should refuse to review these

claims since the State did not raise them in the trial court.
See State v. South, 924 P.2d 354, 355 n.3 (Utah 1996) .
A. THE STATE WAIVED THESE ALTERNATIVE ARGUMENTS
BY NOT RAISING THEM IN THE TRIAL COURT.
The recent Utah Supreme Court decision in South left open
the question of whether an appellate court may affirm on an
8
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findings and conclusions against those claims.

This Court should

refuse to review the State's fact dependent arguments which were
raised for the first time on appeal as an alternative basis for
affirmance.

See Franks, 889 P.2d at 212.

B. THE LACK OF FACTUAL FINDINGS AND EVIDENCE
PRECLUDE RELIANCE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCH
INCIDENT TO ARREST EXCEPTION AS AN ALTERNATIVE
BASIS FOR AFFIRMANCE.
In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), the United
States Supreme Court created an "incident to arrest" exception to
the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.

Pursuant to that

exception, contemporaneous with arrests, "an officer may search
the area within the arrestee's 'immediate control' to prevent the
arrestee from obtaining weapons or destroying evidence."

Wells,

304 Utah Adv. Rep. at 8 (citing Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763, 766).
A warrantless search "incident to arrest" is justified if
the State can show that certain temporal and geographical factors
and exigent circumstances existed at the time of the arrest.
Chimel, 395 U.S. at 764; see also Shipley v. California, 395 U.S.
818, 819-20 (1969); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 33 (1970);
Hvcrh, 711 P.2d at 272 n.2 (Zimmerman, J., concurring) (limiting
warrantless search to "an area within which a suspect could
reasonably be expected to grab a weapon or destroy evidence");
State v. Ricks, 816 P.2d 125, 128 (Alaska 1991) (a search remote
in time or place from arrest cannot be justified).
The Fourth Amendment incident to arrest exception has
been extended to include a search of the passenger compartment of
a vehicle.

See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
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The t e ^ r ^ r a l ..

.e

proximity of the search to the arrest permitted this Court to
affirm on that alternative ground.2
1.

No Factual Findings

In order to properly apply the incident to arrest
exception to justify a warrantless search of the passenger
compartment of a vehicle, the trial court must find that the
search was a contemporaneous incident of the arrest, the vehicle
was within the arrestee's "immediate control" and the search was
conducted for the safety of the officers.

While the Belton rule

may not require "a detailed analysis" by the officer as to
whether or not he/she may lawfully search a vehicle, it
nevertheless requires safety concerns and temporal and
geographical proximity.
In this case, because the State did not argue to the
trial court that the incident to arrest exception justified the
search of the passenger compartment, the trial judge did not rule
on that issue and made no findings relevant to that issue.
Specifically, the record does not contain findings as to whether
the search was made as a contemporaneous incident of arrest, that
the vehicle was in Montoya's immediate control or whether safety
concerns for the officers were involved.

In this case where the

evidence supports a finding that the search was not
contemporaneous, the vehicle was not in the immediate control of

2

In Moreno, the State made its incident to arrest argument
in the trial court before urging this Court to accept that argument
as an alternative basis for affirmance. Moreno, 910 P.2d at 1249
n.l.
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arrest exception to justify a search, they are not being required

to make analyses in the field regarding its application.

In this

case where neither officers nor the State relied on the
exception, it should not be applied as a basis for affirmance.
C. THE SEARCH OF THE PASSENGER COMPARTMENT WAS
NOT A VALID SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST UNDER THE
STATE CONSTITUTION.
The Belton search incident to arrest rule does not apply
to the search of a passenger compartment of a vehicle under
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.

Instead, the

Utah Constitution requires that officers have probable cause and
traditional exigent circumstances to justify the search of a
vehicle.

See State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990). 3

A

majority of the Utah Supreme Court has analyzed Article I,
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution to provide greater protection
than the Fourth Amendment in certain circumstances.

See Larocco,

794 P.2d at 461, 473 (plurality requires probable cause and
traditional exigent circumstances under Utah Constitution, third
justice concurs in result); State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 416
(Utah 1991) .

Pursuant to the Larocco plurality, warrantless

searches "are permitted only where they satisfy their traditional
justification, namely, to protect safety of police or the public
or to prevent the destruction of the evidence."
P.2d at 469-70 (citations omitted).

Larocco, 794

Other Utah decisions have

held that the warrantless search of a vehicle can be justified

3

Montoya was not required to raise this state constitutional
argument in the trial court since the State, which had the burden
of establishing the reasonableness of the search, did not rely on
the search incident to arrest exception below.
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Although they had arrested Montoya for public
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intoxication, they had no information which would establish
probable cause to believe that Montoya had contraband in his car.
Additionally, exigent circumstances did not exist since the
officers had arrested and handcuffed Montoya and had custody and
control over the vehicle; see discussion infra at 16-19.
Accordingly, the search of the passenger compartment violated the
Utah Constitution.
D. PROBABLE CAUSE AND EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES DID
NOT EXIST WHICH JUSTIFIED THE SEARCH OF THE
TRUNK.
As the second step of its two-part alternative grounds
for affirmance argument, the State claims that after officers
searched the passenger compartment and found the syringe and
spoon, they had probable cause and exigent circumstances to
justify the search of the trunk.

State's brief at 19-24.

Assuming this Court agrees with Montoya's argument that
the passenger compartment was not properly searched incident to
arrest, this argument fails.

Alternatively, it fails because

officers had neither probable cause nor exigent circumstances to
justify the search of the trunk and the argument was waived by
not raising it below.

By failing to raise this argument in the

trial court, the State waived this argument for appeal.

See

discussion supra at 7-10.
Additionally, the record does not establish that the
officers had probable cause to search the trunk.

The officers'

determination that Montoya appeared to be under the influence of
drugs did not give rise to any information about the location of
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! he J U u r s spec ilation on

appeal that the search of the trunk "might reveal evidence of a

medical ailment or treatment that contributed to Montoya's
condition" (State's brief at 22) fails to create an exigency.
Nor was there any indication that anyone else might ingest a
substance in the vehicle.
In Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360 (Utah App. 1992),
afjLLd, 875 P.2d 557 (Utah 1994), this Court adopted a three-prong
test for determining whether the community caretaker exception
applies to the Fourth Amendment:
First, did a seizure occur under the Fourth
Amendment definition of that term? Second, based
upon an objective analysis, was the seizure in
pursuit of a bona fide community caretaker
function--under the given circumstances, would a
reasonable officer had stopped a vehicle for a
purpose consistent with community caretaker
functions? Third, based upon an objective
analysis, did the circumstances demonstrate an
imminent danger to life or limb?
Warden, 844 P.2d at 364.
The State's community caretaker claim in this case fails
on all three prongs.
seizure.

First, this case involved a search not a

Second, a reasonable officer would not have searched

the vehicle in pursuit of a bona fide community caretaker
function.

The only person arguably being "protected" by the

search was Montoya; officers already had information needed, and
medical personnel who presumably could obtain further information
if necessary for Montoya's "treatment" were enroute and arrived
shortly after McCarthy.

R. 118-20.

Montoya's "medical needs

were being taken care of by someone other than" the officers;
such care was sufficient.

R. 118-19.

Speculation that officers

might find drugs in the trunk does not satisfy the objective
18

bona fide caretaker function prong.

Even if drugs were found,

officers would have no way of knowing whether that was the
substance ingested by Montoya or whether additional substances
were also involved.

The search of the trunk was a search for

evidence; from an objective perspective, it was not made in
pursuit of a bona fide community caretaker function.
Third, the circumstances did not demonstrate imminent
danger to life or limb.

While Montoya appeared to be under the

influence of drugs, medical personnel were on the way.

R. 118.

Firemen, not EMT's, arrived and were sufficient, and the officers
cancelled the ambulance.

R. 119.

standing and communicating.

Montoya was conscious,

He apparently was not vomiting,

since officers placed him in the police car.

Unfortunately, many

persons ingest illegal substances or large quantities of alcohol.
While medical care may be appropriate in some cases, suspending
Fourth Amendment protections is not unless a true exigency which
may save a life exists.4
These circumstances do not fit in the community caretaker
exception.
mobility.

Nor does an exigency exist based on the inherent
Additionally, the officers did not have probable cause

to search the vehicle.

Accordingly, the State's alternative

argument for affirmance fails.

4

Even if the evidence arguably supported the State's claim
of imminent danger to life or limb and that a reasonable officer
would have searched the vehicle for a community caretaker purpose,
this argument, raised for the first time on appeal, fails due to
waiver and the lack of findings. See discussion supra at 7-10.
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POINT III. THE PUBLIC SAFETY EXCEPTION OF NEW
YORK V. OUARLES DOES NOT PROVIDE AN ALTERNATIVE
BASIS FOR AFFIRMANCE ON THE MIRANDA ISSUE.
The State agrees that the trial judge's ruling that
11

[t] here were no incriminating statements made after [Montoya7 s]

arrest" is not supported by the record.

State's brief at 25.

That determination is therefore clearly erroneous.

See

Appellant's opening brief at 40-41.
The State also agrees that the court tacitly found that
Montoya was not Mirandized; unless this Court applies the public
safety Miranda exception articulated in New York v. Quarles, 467
U.S. 649 (1984), to this case, Montoya's statement should have
been suppressed.

See State's brief at 25.

The only issue for

this Court then is whether the public safety exception of
Quarles, raised by the State for the first time on appeal, should
be extended to justify suspending the protections of Miranda
where an arrestee is intoxicated.
In Quarles, officers chased an armed suspected rapist
through a crowded store.

Id. at 649.

When officers apprehended

the suspect, he had an empty holster and no gun.

Id.

Without

advising the suspect of his Miranda rights, officers asked him
where the gun was.

Id.

Because officers were justified in

believing that the gun was in the store which put the public at
risk, the Court allowed admission of the suspect's response.

The

Court indicated that it was creating "a narrow exception to the
Miranda rule" because the officer asked "only the question
necessary to locate the missing gun" and "the need for answers to
20

questions in a situation posing a threat to the public safety
outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination."

Id. at 655-6.

The State cites only three cases in support of its claim
that Ouarles should be extended to this distinct situation; none
of those cases actually extend Ouarles to a situation where the
claimed public safety is protection of an arrestee who has
ingested drugs.

See State's brief at 24-28, citing Ouarles, 467

U.S. 649; United States v. Padilla, 819 F.2d 952, 960-61 (10th
Cir. 1987); and Franks, 889 P.2d at 209.

Padilla5 and Ouarles

apply the exception in its original public safety context; Franks
does not apply the exception at all.
In Franks, the issue before the Court was whether the
defendant's statement was voluntary.

Id. at 213-14.

Franks did

not involve a situation where the defendant was in custody and
Miranda warnings were required; indeed, the court explicitly
began its analysis, "by emphasizing that this is not a case that
comes under Miranda" because "[d]efendant does not contend that
he was under arrest or otherwise in custody during his
interchange with officers . . . ."

Id.

The Court concluded that

the statement was voluntary, relying on Ouarles in a string cite
for the proposition that the subjective intent of the officers is
not relevant.

Id. at 214.

The language quoted in the State's

5

In Padilla, "[a]fter apprehending Mr. Padilla, who had been
waving a gun, and observing bullet holes in the window of the
residence, [the detective] was faced with the immediate necessity
of determining whether someone inside was injured or armed or
both." Padilla, 819 F.2d at 961.
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brief at 2 8 was made in reference to the voluntariness issue and
not the question of whether intoxication on the part of the
arrestee creates a public safety exception to Miranda.

The

State's suggestion in its brief at 28 that the Franks Court
followed Ouarles and applied a public safety exception to Miranda
based on drug intoxication is incorrect.
Additionally, the language from Franks quoted by the
State emphasizes the impropriety of affirming on the basis of a
public safety exception to Miranda in this case.

Although the

Franks Court discussed voluntariness and did not address whether
a public safety exception to Miranda applies to narcotics
arrestees, even if the passage were applied to this context, the
language of the passage itself indicates that affirmance on this
ground would not be proper.

The State quoted the following

passage from Franks:
When officers respond to a medical emergency and
find the victim in such a state that he or she
may be unable to communicate later with medical
personnel, the officers have a duty to obtain as
much information as they can concerning the
medically relevant cause of the victim's
condition.
State's brief at 28, quoting Franks, 889 P.2d at 214.
was not a victim in this case; he was an arrestee.

Montoya

Montoya was

not in such a state that he would later be unable to communicate,
had already supplied information to officers, and continued to
talk with officers and was well enough that the ambulance was
cancelled.

R. 118.

At the very least, this presents a factual

issue, unresolved by the trial court, as to whether Montoya was
22

"in such a state that he . . . may be unable to communicate later
with medical personnel."

Id. at 214; see discussion regarding

waiver where issue not raised below and disputed facts exist
supra at 7-10.

Franks provides no support for extending the

public safety exception of Ouarles to the facts or this case or
for relying on such a novel and unpreserved extension as an
alternative basis for affirmance.
The Ouarles public safety exception to Miranda applies in
limited circumstances "to protect the general public from the
defendant" and not on "the plight of the particular victim of the
defendant's actions" or the defendant himself.
Provost, 490 N.W.2d 93, 96 (Minn. 1992). 6

See State v.

This Court should

reject the State's attempt to broaden the narrow Ouarles
exception to the facts of this case where the State has failed to
supply this Court with adequate analysis or support for such an
extension.
Additionally, the facts in this case do not justify

6

Instead of relying on the public safety exception where
officers asked the defendant the location of his injured wife
without Mirandizing him, the Provost Court focused on the
California "rescue doctrine." The State has not briefed the rescue
doctrine in this case nor asked the court to rely on it, so this
Court should not consider that analysis.
Additionally, the
exigencies required by the rescue doctrine were not met in this
case since (1) no urgency existed since medical personnel were on
their way and Montoya was able to converse and walk around; in
fact, officers waited for McCarthy to arrive and did not rush
Montoya to a hospital even after obtaining the information; (2)
Montoya was not near death as evidenced by officers proceeding with
the search of the car rather than taking him to a hospital; and
(3) the officers' primary purpose was to find evidence rather than
help Montoya. Furthermore, the lack of findings precludes review.
See discussion supra at 7-10.
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applying a public safety rationale.

Although Montoya was

intoxicated and later treated, his life was not in danger as
evidenced by his ability to walk and talk, the delay in
questioning him about heroin until McCarthy arrived, and the lack
of action taken by officers to immediately treat or transport
Montoya to a hospital once they received answers.

Medical

personnel had been called, the ambulance was cancelled and
Montoya was capable of conversing with such personnel;
questioning by officers was unnecessary and not justified by a
threat to the general public safety or Montoya's safety.

See

discussion supra at 17-19.
If this Court were to apply the Ouarles public safety
exception to these circumstances, it would in essence be
suspending Miranda for intoxicated arrestees.7

In addition,

even if this Court were to extend the Ouarles exception to
protect the safety of the arrestee, the facts do not establish
that Montoya's life was in danger or that the primary purpose of
the questioning was to protect him.

Additionally, this Court

could not apply the broadened exception without factual findings
7

The State's gratuitous footnote 7 on page 28 of its brief,
claiming that Montoya would not have understood the Miranda
warnings, has no bearing on the legal analysis in this case.
Indeed, the State does not cite to any cases and makes no attempt
to supply this Court with legal analysis regarding the importance
of its speculation. Nor does the State provide any factual support
for its speculative comment; the State has not established that
Montoya would not have understood Miranda and the court did not
make findings on that issue. Additionally, arrestees often do not
understand the intricacies of Miranda; such lack of understanding
does not dispense with the Miranda requirement. In fact, in such
circumstances, articulation of Miranda rights takes on greater, not
lesser, importance.
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and further evidence.

It would be unfair to affirm on this

ground, raised for the first time on appeal, where (1) the facts
do not support the exception; (2) Montoya was not given the
opportunity to introduce evidence since the State did not rely on
this ground below; (3) the trial judge did not make factual
findings; and (4) the extension of the exception to include
protection of the defendant is unwarranted and unsupported by
adequate analysis.

Because the Ouarles public safety exception

does not provide an alternative basis for affirmance, the trial
judge's ruling that Miranda was not violated must be reversed.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Appellant Montoya respectfully
requests that his conviction be reversed and the case remanded to
the trial court for a new trial or dismissal.
SUBMITTED this

l*44dL day of January, 1997.

JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

were looking for registration and then they finally come up
with some paper work.

I think it might have even been an

ID card as well as the bill of sale for the owners, and I
recognized those people so
Q

—

Were they people that you knew or were acquainted

with?
A
take —

I knew them, yes, and I had asked Larry if I could
I mean, Paul if I could take care of the car to

save Randy and the family the expense of having it impounded.
Q

So it was your decision to have it returned to the

family members?
A

I think I was the acting supervisor that night and

that's, you know, that's my call.
Q

Are you familiar with the West Valley Police

Department's policies regarding inventory searches?
A

Yes, I am.

Q

And what is the basis of that, to your knowledge?

A

I helped write the zero tolerance policy on

impounding vehicles.
Q

And what is that policy with respect to making

inventory searches of vehicles?

In what circumstances is

that done?
A

Any time we arrest anybody, any time a vehicle's

going to be impounded, an inventory will be done, and if
possible, a canine officer will have the doa do a sniff of
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the vehicle for the purposes of looking for narcotics.
Q

And was that policy followed in this instance?

A

I think we had called for a canine, but they got

off at two that morning, so there wasn't one available,
Q

Now, do you ordinarily make an inventory list in

the course of this inventory search?
A

No, if there's something out of place, you would

note it.

If there was something of value or something like

that, you could take it into custody or you could give it
to the owner.

We do have an inventory sheet.

frequently use it.

I very

I just note it in the narrative of the

report.
Q

Is there a policy for consideration of circumstances!

such as in this case where it is determined the driver of the]
car is not the owner of the car?
A

That's the decision I made as the senior man on

the scene because I know the family.
MR. SHEPHERD:

Thank you.

I have no further

questions.
THE COURT:

All right.

You may cross-examine.

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. BROWN:
Q

Officer McCarthy, you're familiar with me; we've

had conversations in the past.
A

I think we have, Dave.
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